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l~l THE SL'PR£1-lE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
:HE STATE OF L'TAH, 
Plain:iff-Res?ondent, 
Case No. 16421 
J.~.\'ID H.-'1.~'10:1 ~1El:iHART, 
Jefendant-A~cellant. 
------------------------------------------------
:U:i3llTAL i3RIEF OF APPELLANT 
POI~T I 
THE l~TERROGATIO~ OF THE DEFENDANT AT POLICE 
h:EA!:JQL'ARTERS ·,;As SLTFCIDlTLY CL:STODIAL A:m 
SCFFICIE~T~Y COERCIVE AS TO REQL'IRE THE 
"~ll?..A:WA :,·A~;:;::;G" AT THE OUTSET. 
Respondent re:ies a~nost exclusively on Oregon v. Mathiason, 
-~~ ·_· 5 ~1-. 5·J L.t::c. 2d 71-". 97 S.Ct. 7ll (1977), in arguing that 
:-e oo:ice o~~icer's failure :o acprise the defendant of his 
:~nsti:uti:na: ri~~:s at the outset of the interrogation should 
~c: ~a~e required ex::usion of the cefendant's eventual statement. 
?.esponden: apoears :o ':Je arguing that ~lathiason should be interpreted 
:n :ota! isolation ~rom the intent clearly expressed in Miranda v. 
~=i:conJ. 33~ L' 5. :.36. 16 :._.Ed. 694. 86 S.Ct. 1602 (l966), and 
T~e ~iranda line of cases speak to and clarify 
=~e Suore~e Court's concern ~ith those interrogation situations 
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the individual's will amd compell him to speak where he 
would not likely otherwise do so. Mathiason did not change th.J. t 
concern, for such a holding would have overruled Miranda. 
This central concern expressed in the Miranda line of cases 
cannot be satisfied by the use of a simplified formula of 
showing the lack of an actual arrest or by showing that the 
defendant was in fact physically free to leave if he chose to 
do so. While such facts ~be crucial, they are not t'"le so~e 
touchstones in determining the requirement for the ":lir:mda 
warning". If they were then the protections that ~iranda tries 
to guarantee would be ficticious. Respondent's statenent :~at 
the Mathiason co•.1rt announced "restraint on freedom" as :r.e 
determinative factor in establishing "custodial" interrogaticr. 
is totally misleading. Mathiason represents a clarif~cation o: 
the Miranda rule and stands for the proposition that 
[A] noncustodial situation is not converted 
to one in which Miranda applies simplv 
because . the question~ng took p:ace 
in a "coercive environment." 
429 C.S. at 495. 
This is not the same thing as saying that an arrest or i:s 
functional equivalent is the only determinative .:'actor S..:c~ a 
holding would mean that a person "invited" to the station 'louse 
and the told he was free to leave at any time autonatica~:v has 
no right to be informed of his constitutional rights no ~atter 
what other actions the police may take. It requires ·:er: ~~'='=~" 
creativity to see the potential for abusive and uncons:~·~t-'r : 
interrogations arising from such a rule. 
-2-
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Cnquestionably, ~athiason narrows Miranda, but respondent 
skips too lightly over those facts in Mathiason that bear 
dir-ectly on the issue of "custodial" interrogation. First 
of ail, the defendant in >1athi3son •..Jas asked where he would 
9refer to meet the detective 01nd subsequently agreed on the 
state patrol office At the very outset Mathiason was specifically 
told he ~as not under arres~. The interview, which lasted a 
total of 30 ~inutes, ~ook olace in an office rather than an 
I~ ~as conducted by one detective, with 
~c one e:se ~ut :he defendant in the office. The defendant 
~as a oaro:ee under ac~ive supervision and undoubtedly well aware 
v- ~is r~~~:s an~ the consequences of ~aiving them. In any event, 
was :ess than five ~inu~es from the tine the defendant arrived 
- .. s ~""'.0:":: :he ce::'er.c~n: in :•athiascn exercised consider01ble 
~e~32~3l ::~=r~: ~n :~e s~t~ation from ~he outset; the coercive 
:ressures were ~ini~a: and ~~e defendant likelv had sufficient 
~nderstanding a: everv stage of ~he verv short period during 
--~~.-~ ~is ~i~~::s ~ig~t ~~·:e ~een ?Ut in ~eopardy. 
In :his oresen: ~ase. the sworn testimony of the investi-
ei:her onlv as ~n afterthought ~v the detectives. or after the 
~~:errczat~rs fe:: :~e ~e~e~dant ~ad been su~ficiently 
Jetective 3ailess states that the 
":re-·.,·ar-n~nz" ~:1:err-oga:io:t :3sted onl:1 ~0 ~inuntes (T. 137). 
=~~~~~nee :] :~~ ~~t2rr2;1::on :r~~scri?: itself will show this 
)c , ::-~,;.:; ·~n.,!ere,;:~:c.•:'.:w :":e er.tire i:-~terrogation lasted 
- 3-
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for two hours and 20 minutes, and took 44 l/2 pages for 
transcription. The beginning of the "Miranda warning" is 
recorded on page 21. Simple mathematics denies the detective's 
estimate of the time spent questioning the defendant before anv 
warning was given. Indeed, it may have been as much as one hour 
before the defendant was first appraised of his constitutional 
rights. Detective Bailess further states that the entire time 
was not taken up by questioning, but there were breaks allow~ng 
the defendant to go to the restroom or smoke a cigarette (T l:j) 
A complete reading of the interrogation transcript gives no 
indication of such rest periods. In fact, the transcript of 
the questioning indicates that the interrogation was on contin~o~: 
session beginning at 10:10 in the morning anc ending at ~~ Jj 
that afternoon. 
Several other factors strongly point to the probability that 
the failure to give the defendant his rightful warnings at ~he 
outset was either an oversight or part of a plov by the de:ective: 
An examination of the pre-warning questions and ans•..;e:cs revea:s 
no apparent attempts by the defendant to falsi:v his ans·N·ers 
or to cover up his actions. In fact, Detective 3ailess stated 
under oath that the pre-warning answers •..;ere consistent ·.-:itr. 
his understanding of the facts at that tioe (Pre-trial :-!otion 
Transcript, 18, 19). Yet at the end of this period o: c;ues:ior.i-: 
immediately prior to the "Miranda 1-:arning" the follo,,·:.ng 
exchange took place: 
Q. Dave, your story is - a story 
-4-
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A. ' . .Jhat c1n I say, I'm not lying. 
Q ~ell, you're not telling us the truth. 
(Interrogat~on 7ranscript, 20) 
The inescapable concl~sion is the before the interview even took 
place the defendant Nas, in the minds of the investigating officers, 
:he cause of the injuries to the victim, and the sole point of 
focus of the officer's investigation. This conclusion is based 
~ot onl? on a read~ng of the ~nterrogation transcript, but from the 
testl~On? a~ Officer 3ailess ~imself (Pre-trial ~otion Transcript, 
15) . 
:~is :cnc_us~on :a~es en serious constitutional demensions 
~hen the fc:lawing sta:ecent, ma~e j? the interrogator during 
A statement that proves not only 
:ha: t~e ac:ice officers had had ?rior ~iscussions with the 
~e~e~ds~: ~efcre the ~nterrogation took place, (a fact that the 
-· . 
,. Jc ~:ou 
f~rs: ·Cr :: 
desire :o consult Nith an attorney 
~a·:e cne ~u~~~g :~~s i~terview? 
~::'s _:.: ::o ·.rou _t's li~e we talked about. 
Y:~ ~~o~~ :~- you'2 :a:~ to an a:torney, he d tell 
;au ~o: to sJ; anything You know that. We 
ta:~ed abou: t~at 
21. emphasis added) 
• ·-::: ::-2:3 :'·=-':-'.Cc:- ': 
- J-
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in protecting the defendant's rights. In reality, the 
significance on this statement is its proof of at least one 
prior conversation the police officer had with the defendant 
A conversation that, at minimum, discussed the drawbacks of the 
defendant consulting an attorney. This statement, taken in contex: 
of the entire interrogation, can have no other meaning and 
Detective Bailess's sworn testimony of no prior discussions ~i:~ 
defendant (Pre-trial Motion Transcript, 13, and T. llC.) cannot 
overcome this. More importantly, it is highly likel:: that trial 
judge was misled by the officer's in-court state~ents as to pr:or 
discussions (not to mention his statements regarding the lengt~ a~ 
the pre-warning questioning and total duration and intensit:: of 
the interrogation) . 
Unlike Mathiason, the defendant herein was tole to coce 
down to the police station where a two hour-plus isolatec 
interrogation took place, not in an office, but in d interrogac:~ 
room. Except for some prior conversation •..;ith these detecti·,es 
where the necessity of an attorney for the defencant had '::·een 
discussed, the defendant had had no previous experiences ~n cea_:~: 
with the police or the criminal justice syste~. ~iranda 
established and Mathiason reaffirmed that a citizen mc:st '::e 
appraised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and 
to have an attorney present if he so chooses whenever he 
undergoes: 
.questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person 
has been .deprived of his freecom 
of action in any significant wa:: 
429 U.S. at 474. 
Mathiason does not hold that a defendant must be overtl_· ~~n-~~ 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the opportunit? to leave the police station in order for 
th~se constitutional rights to attach. David Meinhart had been 
si~nificantly ~eprived if his freedon to act pursuant 
to those constitutional rights by the time the police got 
around to informing him of those rights. 
POl:'lT II 
THE DEFE:lDA:!T DID :lOT KNOHINGLY AND 
I:lTELLIGE:!TLY r,JAI'!E HIS PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF I~CRIMI~ATION AND THCS HIS STATEMENT 
~AS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED I:lTO EVIDENCE. 
In Fare , . >L d-: a e l C . [~. s. , 61 L.Ed. 2d 197, 
:)Q s ct. (19/9) the Supreme Court rei:erated its long held 
?Osi::i..on ::~a: 
af:er :he ~arnings are given the 
accused, " [ ~] f the interrogation continues 
without ~he oresence of an attorney and a 
statec:cent :..a ta:Ze!1, a l":eav·y burden rests 
on the ~overn~ent :o demonstrate that the 
defenda;~ ~nowing:v and intelligently 
~ai~·ed ~is ?rivilege agaisnt self-
i~c~~mi~3ticn ~nd ~is rig~t to retained 
or ~ppointed counsel 
61 L.Ed. 2d at 212. 
Jur~~~ ~~e Sta:e's ~:reno: ::a ~ee: t~is burden, at pre-trial 
~e had ~ad no con:ac: ~i:h :he defendant prior to the interview. 
~is interro~ation state~ent (suoted above) not onlv establishes 
:ha~ he h1d had ~ prior discuss~on. but indicates that he had 
~::enp:ed to convince the defendant that it would not be in 
th~ 2~~e~d3~:'s ~est interests to ha·;e ~n attorney at that time. 
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light how the trial court was likely misled in its 
determination of the admissibility of the defendant's statement 
In determining the voluntariness of a waiver the Fare 
Court declares that the admLssibility of an accused's statement 
is to be determined upon an examination of the "totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" (61 L.Ed. 
2d at 212) and that this approach mandates inquiry into the 
accused's: 
.age, experience, education back-
ground and intelligence and into whether 
he has the capacity to understand the 
warnines given him, the nature of 
his Fifth Amendment rights, and the 
consequences of waiving those rights. 
61 L.Ed. 2d at 212. 
We have discussed in our initial brief the defendant's age, 
background, and intelligence as they relate to his ca?acit:r 
to make a voluntary waiver and therefore we will not :ucther 
labor those points. However, it is crucial to underscore the 
fact that by testifying that he had had no other conversations 
(let alone a discussion on the merits of having an attorney). 
with the defendant, Detective Bailess deprived the trial judge 
of a full appreciation of the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's supposed waiver of his rights. 
In the Fare case the 16 l/2 year old defendant, implicate~ 
in a murder, was taken into custody and advised of his rights 
Following several statements indicating a reluctance to talk to 
police he made a number of incriminating admissions. In 
applying the "totality of the circumstances" test and in finci~: 
voluntary waiver, the Court specifically noted the :ollo•,.;i.ng 
factors: the defendant had considerable ex?erience ~ith ~~e 
-8-
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police, he had a record of several arrests, he had served 
time in a ~outh camp, he had been on probation for several years, 
he was under the full-time supervision of probation authorities, 
he ·,1as not worn down by improper interrogation or lengthy 
questioning nor was there any indications that he did not 
understand his rights or the consequences of waiving them. 
We would simply point out to this Court that David Meinhart 
":-las none of the ?ersonal background the Surperne Court looked 
tD in Fare, and that there are solid indications that David 
~ein~art did not fully understand his rights and the consequences 
of waiver. The defendant did not understand, and the trial 
judge was never ?errnitted to see how or why that happened. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L~N R. BROw"N 
Attorney for Appellant 
_q_ 
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